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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

COMMENT

DON’T MOW OVER THE YARD-MAN INFERENCE: GUARDING
AGAINST IMPROPER MODIFICATION OF WELFARE BENEFITS
PROVIDED IN A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

I.

INTRODUCTION

Employees join a union and allow it to negotiate a collective bargaining
agreement because the relationship provides them security during the term of
the agreement. In fact, the collective bargaining arrangement generally
provides security throughout an employee’s relationship with the employer.
An agreement may even provide benefits into retirement.1 At retirement,
however, problems may arise, particularly in the area of health and life
insurance benefits.
An employee enjoying health and life insurance benefits provided by the
collective bargaining agreement may believe that these benefits are going to
last for his or her entire life. That is, the employee believes the benefits to be
vested.2 Such benefits would provide a sense of security because the employee
and, perhaps, the employee’s spouse and family, would be covered for the life
of the employee. Unfortunately, this sense of security is often false. Health
and life insurance benefits, also known as welfare benefits, are quite fragile
once the collective bargaining agreement providing them has expired.

1. See, e.g., Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.
157, 160 (1971) (allowing retirees to partake in the employee group health insurance plan by
contributing the required premiums).
2. In case it is unclear, “vested” means that the retiree has a right to receive the benefits and
the employer has a correlative duty to continue providing the benefits. See Deering v. Deering,
437 A.2d 883, 885 (Md. 1981) (stating that a pension is generally regarded as “vested” when the
minimum term of employment necessary to receive retirement pay has been completed).
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Employers facing financial ruin or wishing to save money may desire, or even
be required, to terminate welfare benefits that are received by retirees.
The contractual nature of the collective bargaining agreement prevents
revoking the benefits from active employees during the agreement term, but
retirees present a different situation. While the retirees may believe that their
benefits are to last a lifetime, or vest, the actual contractual language may be
more ambiguous. In this case, an employer might be able to unilaterally
terminate the benefits. A retiree facing such a situation may be devastated
financially and emotionally. The union no longer has an obligation to
represent the individual because he or she has retired,3 and statutory provisions
protecting the retiree’s pension do not extend to welfare benefits.4
This was the precise situation facing retirees in United Auto., Aerospace,
and Agriculture Workers of America v. Yard-Man.5 In this case, it seemed
that the employer had decided to terminate welfare benefits when facing
financial trouble.6 In 1983, the Sixth Circuit prevented the unilateral
termination, holding that the employer had a contractual duty to continue
paying the welfare benefits for the life of the retiree.7 It reached this decision
by using what has come to be known as the Yard-Man inference.8 The
collective bargaining agreement had expired and was deemed ambiguous by
the Sixth Circuit.9 In an attempt to discern the parties’ intent as to the vesting
of benefits, the court decided to use an inference as a factor in making that
determination.10 The Yard-Man inference follows the following logic: the
court reasoned that because these were welfare benefits, they were considered
deferred forms of compensation when the union bargained for them.11 Since it
was presumable that the employees forewent an increase in their present
compensation, it would be ridiculous for the parties to leave the welfare
benefits to the uncertainties of the next collective bargaining agreement.12
Thus, an inference was raised that the benefits were to vest. The inference was
then added to other factors in determining the parties’ intent.13
Three Circuits have joined the Yard-Man court, while three others have
split, refusing to use a “gratuitous inference” in determining the parties’
3. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 172.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (1994).
5. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v.
Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1478 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984).
6. See id.
7. See id. at 1482-83.
8. See id. at 1482. See also Shannon P. Duffy, Health Benefits Not for Life, 3rd Circuit
Says, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 12, 1999, at 1.
9. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479.
10. See id. at 1482.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
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intentions.14 Most recently, the Third Circuit has joined the splitting circuits in
rejecting the Yard-Man analysis.15 It is possible that the Supreme Court will
take up the issue in a future term.16
The thrust of this Comment will be in support of using the inference as part
of the larger social policy of providing some type of health insurance for
retirees who are left rather unprotected by the collective bargaining
relationship. With a potentially insolvent Medicare system and rising costs of
health insurance, the situation for retirees facing the termination of benefits is
not encouraging. The Yard-Man inference could be used to maintain benefits
that an employer initially promised a retiree until Congress adopts better
legislation in pursuit of the larger social policy of lifetime benefits for all
retirees.
Part II of this Comment provides a background of the law surrounding
collective bargaining, welfare benefits and the Yard-Man decision.17 It also
discusses the current circuit split in place.18 Part III examines the criticisms of
the Yard-Man decision19 by briefly summarizing and analyzing each from a
critical perspective. Part IV discusses current judicial alternatives to such an
inference, concluding that any alternative is inadequate in providing sufficient
protection to the parties’ intentions.20 Finally, Part V demonstrates that the
Yard-Man is an acceptable analysis.21 In addition, Part V investigates the

14. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Connors Steel, 855 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the employer was obligated to continue providing benefits after the expiration of the
labor agreement); Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that retiree
medical and life insurance benefits must be provided beyond the life of the collective bargaining
agreement); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Textron, Inc., 836 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that
the former employer, not the successor employer, is obligated to keep retiree benefits current after
the sale of the company ); International Ass’n of Machinists v. Masonite Corp., 122 F.3d 228 (5th
Cir. 1997) (reversing and remanding a district court determination that the company was not
obligated to provide lifetime benefits to retirees ); International Union, United Auto., Aerospace
& Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130 (3rd Cir. 1999)
(affirming a lower court’s decision that there is no presumption that parties to a collective
bargaining agreement intend retiree welfare benefits to continue beyond the expiration of the
labor agreement).
15. See Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d at 139.
16. See Duffy, supra note 8, at 1. However, while the split may give rise to the Supreme
Court granting certiorari, it is also possible that there will be no resolution. The Yard-Man
inference is used to determine the intent of the union and the employer, and often is applied to
very different language. The Supreme Court could deny certiorari based on the fact that it would
be making a determination based largely on the facts of an individual case.
17. See infra notes 23-215 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 162-215 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 216-80 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 281-344 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 345-52 and accompanying text.
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current state of legislation impacting upon this issue and discusses potential
legislation to relieve the situation faced by retirees.22
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the Yard-Man decision and its applications, one
must first consider the background to the opinion and the cases making up the
circuit split. First, it is helpful to investigate the statutes involved in such a
decision and how they confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts. Next, it is
necessary to discuss the Yard-Man decision and the U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals decisions shaping the analysis of this Comment.
A.

Introduction to Jurisdiction, the National Labor Management Relations
Act and the Early Cases
1.

Jurisdiction

A reader who is new to the world of labor relations will notice that the
cases involving the Yard-Man analysis are heard in federal court, yet there is
little explanation as to how the federal courts maintain jurisdiction.23 A suit
involving a Yard-Man problem may be brought by retirees or their union under
§ 301(a) of the National Labor Management Relations Act (“NLMRA”).24
The NLMRA provides that any suit involving the breach of a contract between
an employer and a labor organization shall be heard in a district court of
appropriate jurisdiction.25
A simple answer to the question of jurisdiction is that the NLMRA confers
jurisdiction. However, an astute reader will notice that the federal courts are
not relying on state common-law principles as most federal courts do when
deciding contracts cases.26 Rather, the federal courts fashion their own laws
when working under § 301.27 In some cases, the NLRMA itself provides the

22. See infra notes 353-66 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1478; Keffer, 872 F.2d at 61; Connors Steel, 855 F.2d at
1500; Textron, 838 F.2d at 7; Skinner, 188 F.3d at 130.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).
25. Id. § 185(a).
26. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1478; Keffer, 872 F.2d at 61; Connors Steel, 855 F.2d at
1505; Textron, 838 F.2d at 7; Skinner, 188 F.3d at 130. Normally, if the federal courts are acting
under anything other than federal question jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, they must
apply the law as defined in the state from which the case arises. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938).
27. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, decided that § 301 gave the federal courts more than
jurisdiction. The majority concluded that § 301 also provided for the authority to create
substantive law. See id. In addition, the law that was applied under § 301 was federal law. See
id. at 456. Douglas argued that state law could be used as a guide in determining the substantive
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appropriate substantive law.28 In other cases, a federal court must use “judicial
inventiveness” to fashion a legal solution to the problem facing the court.29
Regardless, the court looks to national labor policy when developing
substantive law.30 Without the ability to fashion federal substantive law, the
Sixth Circuit could not have created an inference of vested retiree benefits.
2.

The NLRA and Pittsburgh Plate Glass

The most obvious remedy for a retired union member losing benefits
seems to be provided by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).31 But, in
Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
the Supreme Court held that the unilateral modification of retiree health
insurance provided for in a collective bargaining agreement was not prohibited
by the NLRA, even if the modification occurred during the contract term.32
The Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass first noted that retirees could not be
considered “employees” for purposes of the NLRA.33 In addition, retirees
were not to be considered as part of the bargaining unit represented by the
union in negotiations with management.34 To support this conclusion, the
Court reasoned that the interests between the active employees and the retirees
were not mutual.35 In fact, the Court feared that “union representatives on
occasion might see fit to bargain for improved wages or other conditions
favoring active employees at the expense of retirees’ benefits.”36 In essence,
the Court decided that because of the discrepancies between the interests of the
active employees and the retirees, it would be better for the retirees to
negotiate alone.37

law to be applied to a problem, but once applied the state law was to be subsumed into the federal
law. That is, it would become federal law. Id. at 457.
28. See id. at 457.
29. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457.
30. See id. at 456.
31. After all, the NLRA provides that “terms and conditions” of employment are mandatory
subjects of bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994). It appears that health and life insurance
benefits are such conditions of employment. Usually, management and employees view such
benefits as deferred compensation, given to the employees rather than an increase in wages, for
instance. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
32. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157,
188 (1971).
33. See id. at 168.
34. See id. at 172-73.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 173.
37. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 173 (emphasis added).
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Next, the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Court faced the issue of whether the
subject of retiree benefits was a mandatory or permissive bargaining term.38
The NLRA provides that “terms and conditions of employment” are mandatory
terms.39 The Court decided that health insurance benefits were not “terms and
conditions of employment” under the NLRA.40 Under previous decisions, the
Court held that certain terms were mandatory bargaining provisions under the
NLRA, even if the worker in question was outside the employment
relationship.41 However, in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the decision turned on the
impact of retiree benefits on active employees.42 The retirees’ benefits did not
impact the terms and conditions of the employment of active employees to an
extent that justified recognizing them as mandatory subjects for collective
bargaining.43
Finally, the Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass concluded that because the
benefits were only permissive terms of bargaining, modifying the benefits,
even in mid-term, was not an unfair labor practice under the NLRA.44 Instead,
the retirees were to seek a remedy in an action for breach of contract.45 Since
the parties were not required to bargain for the term under the NLRA initially,
the Court refused to find a violation of the statute (i.e. an unfair labor
practice).46 Despite one of the parties’ apparent breach of the contract, there
was no unfair labor practice.47

38. See id. at 177-82. In 1958, the Supreme Court held that collective bargaining could take
place over issues that were not mandated by the NLRA. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of BorgWarner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). Thus, certain issues must be bargained for, while others are
simply permissive subjects of bargaining. See Donald T. Weckstein, The Problematic Provision
and Protection of Health and Welfare Benefits for Retirees, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 101, 104
(1987). Weckstein also noted that Wooster provided for a third category of benefits, including
those items that were illegal over which to bargain. See id.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
40. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 182.
41. See id. at 178 (citing Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959)). Oliver involved
anti-trust laws and the establishment of minimum rent payments that carriers would pay to truck
drivers that owned their own truck. The Court ignored the issue of whether the truck owners
were employees and held that the rent payment was a mandatory term of the bargaining
agreement, and thus immune from state anti-trust laws. See id.
42. See id. at 180.
43. See id. It had been argued that the employer and active employees would receive the
benefit of lower costs for health insurance because adding the retirees would increase the size of
the group and thereby lower rates. The Court noted that there was no guarantee that the retirees
would not increase the cost because of their higher medical expenses. Id.
44. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 188.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 187.
47. See id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

DON’T MOW OVER THE YARD-MAN INFERENCE

267

Thus, retirees could not pursue a claim against an employer who modified
their benefits through their union under the NLRA.48 Rather, the Court forced
retirees to pursue claims under § 301 of the NLRMA for breach of contract.49
In writing the opinion for Pittsburgh Plate Glass, Justice Brennan pointed out
that in his opinion such a remedy provided the retirees with adequate
protection.50 Unfortunately, Brennan could not foresee the problems for
retirees who lack representation and try to pursue a claim under general
contract principles.
3.

Recent Trends and Statistics

Recent trends in employer-provided health insurance for retirees are quite
disturbing. At one time, health insurance was considered a low-cost benefit,
but now the costs have risen sharply.51 A Department of Labor study
attributed this spike in costs to an aging population and rising medical costs.52
In response to the rising costs, employers began terminating such benefits, not
just for retirees, but across the board. In 1991, forty-nine percent of employees
participating in an employer provided medical benefits plan were not required
to pay contributions.53 In 1997, only thirty-one percent of employees were not
required to pay a contribution in order to participate in such a plan.54 Thus,
while employers may be maintaining benefit plans, a greater percentage of
employers now require the employees to pay the fees.
Such trends were accelerated in 1990, when the Federal Accounting
Standards Board changed its regulations and required employers to recognize
the cost of retiree insurance when the cost is incurred, rather than deferring
recognition until the future liabilities are realized.55 In firms with a high ratio
of retirees to active employees, this represented a large increase in costs. Thus,
companies began facing financial difficulties in providing for retirees.56
An individual who retires before the age of sixty-five faces a severe plight
when a company terminates health insurance benefits after the expiration of a
48. See id.
49. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 188.
50. See id.
51. Jeannette A. Rogowski & Lynn A. Karoly, Study 10: Retirement and Health Insurance
Coverage, HEALTH BENEFITS AND THE WORK FORCE 117 ( 1992).
52. See id.
53. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits Survey Table 5. Percent of full-time
employees participating in employer-sponsored medical benefits by type of medical plan and
requirement for employee contributions, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1997, available at
http://stats.bls.gov/news.release/ebs3.t05.htm (last modified Nov. 10, 1999).
54. See id.
55. See Gregory J. Ossi, It Doesn’t Add Up: The Broken Promises of Lifetime Health
Benefits, Medicare, and Accounting Rule FAS 106 Do Not Equal Satisfactory Medical Coverage
for Retirees, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 233, 233-34 (1996).
56. See Rogowski & Karoly, supra note 51, at 117.
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collective bargaining agreement. In such case, there is a gap between the
termination and the onset of Medicare benefits. Because of the strong
economy and aging population, this has become a common trend.57 However,
retirees who wait until the age of sixty-five to retire may also face economic
hardship when a former employer cuts welfare benefits, which the retiree
believed were supposed to last a lifetime. Medicare only covers about fifty
percent of a person’s medical expenses.58 In addition, Medicare does not cover
certain costs, such as long-term hospitalization.59 Thus, retirees must find
supplemental coverage. If the retiree has received insurance through a former
employer since retiring, a search for affordable supplemental coverage may be
a daunting task. In addition, the issue of an insolvent Medicare system has
arisen in recent years.60
B.

The Yard-Man Decision

The Yard-Man incidents began in 1974.61 Yard-Man, Inc. and the United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
(U.A.W.) signed a collective bargaining agreement in 1974.62 The agreement
covered employees at the Yard-Man, Inc. plant in Jackson, Michigan.63 The
agreement lasted three years, expiring in 1977,64 and provided that when a
retired employee turned sixty-five years of age, the company would pay
insurance benefits equal to those received by active employees.65
Unfortunately, the plant closed in 1975, and all employees were
discharged.66 However, under the terms of the agreement, sixty-five-year old
retired workers continued receiving the benefits provided for in the
agreement.67 In 1977, the company notified the Jackson, Michigan retirees
that they would no longer be receiving those benefits once the agreement
expired.68 The U.A.W. filed a grievance under § 301 claiming that the
termination of the benefits constituted a breach of the collective bargaining
agreement.69
57. See id.
58. AARP, THE PUBLIC POLICY AGENDA 1999 6-1 (1999).
59. See Ossi, supra note 55, at 257 n.207.
60. See id. at 257.
61. See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1478 (Cin. Cir. 1983).
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 1480.
66. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1478.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id. The U.A.W. also filed a second count, which was also dealt with by the Sixth
Circuit. See id. When Yard-Man closed the plant, it offered to pay the employees a lump sum of
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Initially, the union waived arbitration, and at trial, Yard-Man and the union
moved for summary judgment.70 The trial judge granted the union’s motion,
finding that the company had violated the terms of the contract by terminating
the benefits at the end of the contract.71 The trial judge reasoned that the
benefits were to last for the entire life of the retiree.72 That is, the benefits
vested upon the retiree attaining the age of sixty-five.73
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit began its analysis by stating that general
contract principles are to be used so long as they are consistent with national
labor policies.74 Generally, the issue of whether the benefits would continue
beyond the expiration of the agreement depended upon the intent of the
parties.75
The court continued by listing contract principles relevant in deciding
whether the parties intended the benefits to vest.76 The court reasoned that the
language of the collective bargaining agreement must be searched for
unambiguous demonstrations of intent.77 However, in order to understand the
language, the court stated that it must look to the context giving rise to that
language.78 Generally, that language must be read in light of the contract as a
whole, and no part should be interpreted as rendering another nugatory.79 If
the term is ambiguous, the court must look to other parts of the contract to shed
light on the ambiguity.80 Finally, considerations must be made for national
labor policies.81
With this stated, the court applied the contract principles to the provision
of the collective bargaining agreement, which conferred welfare benefits upon
retirees.82 The court found the language ambiguous because it stated that the
retiree would receive benefits equal to those received by the active group of
the present value of certain pension rights. See id. at 1478. The retirees overwhelmingly
accepted this offer, but the U.A.W. requested specific performance of Yard-Man’s obligation to
purchase annuities to cover these pensions. See id. The court, reversing the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the U.A.W., held that genuine issues of material fact existed for a
jury as to whether Yard-Man’s payment of lump sums created accord and satisfaction concerning
its obligations to purchase annuities. See id. at 1488.
70. See id. at 1478.
71. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1478.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 1479 (citing Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448,
456 (1957)).
75. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 1479-80.
80. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d. at 1480.
81. See id.
82. See id.
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employees.83 The court held that this could be interpreted in two ways: (1) as a
reference only to the nature of the benefits; or (2) as incorporating the
durational limits of the active group.84 Regardless, the language was unclear
whether the benefits were to last the lifetime of the retiree or were to terminate
with the collective bargaining agreement.85
Because of the ambiguity, the court looked to other parts of the contract
and to national labor policy.86 The court found that the durational language of
the provisions for active- employee benefits was inapplicable to retirees.87 In
addition, the employer’s behavior was not consistent with the interpretation
that the contract term was meant to include the duration of the active group.88
Once the plant closed, the active employees’ benefits were discontinued.89
There was no provision protecting the employees if they left before
retirement.90 However, the retirees continued to receive benefits after the plant
closed.91 If the contract was intended to incorporate the same duration as
active-employees’ benefits, then the company would have terminated the
retiree benefits immediately upon closing the facility as it did with the active
employees.92
The provisions for health insurance were limited in the event that the
retiree died.93 This fact raised a reasonable inference that the “spousedependent child provision was meant as an exception to the anticipated
continuation of benefits beyond the life of the collective bargaining
agreement.”94
In addition, the collective bargaining agreement allowed an early
retirement at age fifty- five, but retirees could not claim benefits until age
sixty-five.95 Applying the principle that no contract term should be interpreted
in a way that renders another nugatory or illusory,96 the court reasoned that if
someone retired at age fifty-five, that person had to pay for insurance until
attaining the age of sixty-five. After age sixty-five, the company’s promised
benefits took effect.97 “If retiree benefits were terminated at the end of the
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See id.
See id.
See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1480.
See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1481.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1481.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1480.
See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1481.
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collective bargaining agreement’s three-year term, this promise is completely
illusory for many early retirees under the age of 62.”98
The crux of the debate surrounding Yard-Man focuses on the court’s last
point.99 The court held that “the finding of an intent to create interminable
rights to retiree insurance benefits in the absence of explicit language, is not, in
any discernible way, inconsistent with federal labor law.”100 Parties to a
collective bargaining agreement generally understand retiree benefits to be
deferred forms of compensation and only a permissive topic for bargaining.101
Thus, reasonable parties would not leave them to such an uncertain future as
being contingent on future negotiations.102 For this reason, the court stated that
these benefits carried a special “status,” and they would, in the absence of
explicit language, create an inference that the parties intended the benefits to
last the entire life of the retiree.103
It is important to note that the Sixth Circuit did not create a presumption in
favor of vested benefits in every case.104 That is, the inference created by the
context of the collective bargaining agreement does not shift the burden of
proof to the employer.105 A presumption would be unfair for employers who
may never have intended welfare benefits to vest and later found themselves in
financial trouble.106 Instead, the burden of proof is still upon the retirees to
demonstrate that, more likely than not, the parties intended the benefits to

98. Id.
99. See id. at 1482.
100. Id. “The employees [were] presumably aware that the union owe[d] no obligation to
bargain for continued benefits for retirees. If they fore[went] wages now in expectation of retiree
benefits, they would [have] want[ed] assurance that once they retire[d] they [would] continue to
receive such benefits regardless of the bargain reached in subsequent agreements.” Id.
101. See id.
102. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
103. Id.
104. See id. The Sixth Circuit actually reversed a case in which the district court held that
health insurance benefits vest as a matter of federal common law, regardless of the collective
bargaining agreement’s terms. See Michael S. Melbinger & Marianne W. Culver, The Battle of
the Rust Belt: Employer’s Rights to Modify the Medical Benefits of Retirees, 5 DEPAUL BUS. L.J.
139, 145 (1992-1993) (citing Hansen v. White Farm Equip. Co., 42 B.R. 1005, 1016-19 (N.D.
Ohio 1984), rev’d, In Re White Farm Equip Co., 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1986)).
105. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482. “This is not to say that retiree insurance benefits are
necessarily interminable by their nature. Nor does any federal labor policy identified to this
Court presumptively favor the finding of interminable rights to retiree insurance benefits when
the collective bargaining agreement is silent.” Id.
106. It is not the intent of this Comment to suggest that welfare benefits should vest in every
collective bargaining agreement with ambiguous language. A presumption in favor of vested
benefits would come close to doing this. Instead, it is only suggested that the Yard-Man inference
is a method for forcing employers to live up to the agreement originally struck with the union and
employees.
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vest.107 The inference may or may not be created by the context of the
agreement.108 It is this final part of the Yard-Man analysis that provides the
subject of this Comment.
C. The Development of the Analysis in the 6th Circuit
The inference has seen the most development in the circuit in which it
originated.109 Yard-Man’s use in other circuits that adopted the inference has
not been as widespread.110 Because much criticism focuses on the dangers
involved in the potentially broad development of the analysis, it will be helpful
to discuss how the Sixth Circuit has analyzed similar problems since the initial
decision.
Just one year after Yard-Man, the Sixth Circuit took up the same issue in
Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc.111 An employer had again ceased to provide
health and life insurance benefits to retirees after a collective bargaining
agreement expired.112 The court, applying Yard-Man, found that the company
breached the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in cutting the
benefits.113 The court, after finding ambiguity in the terms of the agreement,
again turned to the intent of the parties.114
However, upon an initial read, it would appear that the court broadened the
inference into a presumption in favor of vested rights.115 In fact, the court
focused on the language in Yard-Man which stated that “when parties contract
for benefits which accrue upon achievement of retiree status, there is an
inference that the parties likely intended those benefits to continue so long as
the beneficiary remains a retiree.”116 This makes it sound as if the mere
existence of welfare benefits along with ambiguous language in the agreement
alone would be enough to vest the benefits in the retirees.117

107. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482; Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus. Inc., 836 F.2d
1512, 1517 (8th Cir. 1988).
108. See Yard-Man at 1482.
109. See Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 773 F.2d 669, 676 (6th Cir. 1985); Armistead v.
Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1293-97 (6th Cir. 1991); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes, 73 F.3d 648,
654-56 (6th Cir. 1996); Fox v. Varity Corp., No. 95-1730, 1996 WL 382272, at *2 (6th Cir. July
5, 1996); International Union v. Loral Corp., No. 92-02391, 1997 WL 49077, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb.
3, 1997).
110. See infra notes 126-58 and accompanying text.
111. See Weimer, 773 F.2d at 669-77.
112. See id. at 670-71.
113. See id. at 676.
114. See id. at 672.
115. See id. at 672-76. The court indicated at the beginning of this analysis that such retiree
benefits are normally vested. Id. at 672.
116. See Weimer, 773 F.2d at 676 (citing Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1489).
117. See id.
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Actually, the court continued to interpret the inference as an inference.
The court stated, “in light of the insurance provisions’ conditioning the grant of
retiree insurance benefits only on the retiree’s remaining retired and
unemployed, and in light of the parties’ failure to specify that retiree insurance
benefits expired with the termination of the collective bargaining agreements,
we hold that the general termination clause does not support a finding that
retiree benefits ended when the agreements expired.”118 Thus, the court
continued Yard-Man’s trend of considering the existence of retiree benefits in
light of other factors. 119 The court also considered the language and absence
of certain language in the collective bargaining agreement in concluding that
the parties must have intended vested benefits.120
In 1991, the Sixth Circuit took another case involving the termination of
welfare benefits paid to retirees in accordance with collective bargaining
agreements.121 In Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., the court again found for the
retirees and did so on the basis of the deferred compensation argument used in
Yard-Man.122 The court never stated that the existence of welfare benefits
alone was enough to establish vested benefits.
Perhaps the clearest interpretation of the inference came in Golden v.
Kelsey-Hayes Co.123 In reviewing a preliminary injunction, the court held that
the employees could likely show that the employer breached its contractual
obligations by terminating benefits received by retirees and the spouses of
deceased retirees.124 The court was clear that “Yard-Man does not shift the
burden of proof to the employer, nor does it require specific anti-vesting
language before a court can find that the parties did not intend the benefits to
vest.”125 The court instead sought to use the inference and other factors as
guides in discerning the parties’ intent.126

118. Id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (6th Cir. 1991).
122. See id. at 1297. “A basic premise of the Yard-Man, that retirement insurance benefits
are a form of deferred compensation applies equally to this case. Because these benefits are
deferred compensation, it is unreasonable to suppose that the parties to the [collective bargaining
agreement] intended to permit Vernitron to terminate the retirement insurance program
unilaterally.” Id.
123. See Golden v. Kelsoy-Hayes, 73 F.3d 648, 654-56 (6th Cir. 1996). The Golden court
was faced with the issue of whether or not to affirm the District Court’s grant of a preliminary
injunction preventing the employer from terminating benefits. See id. at 651-52. As one element
of a preliminary injunction, the court had to decide if the plaintiff-retirees were likely to succeed
on the merits. See id. at 653. Thus, the court had to apply the Yard-Man analysis. See id. at 65356.
124. See id. at 657.
125. Id. at 656.
126. See id.
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The Sixth Circuit continues to use this analysis in deciding cases involving
the termination or modification of welfare benefits provided for in collective
bargaining agreements.127 In addition, other circuits have also adopted the
analysis.
D. The Yard-Man Inference Used in Other Circuits
In 1987, four years after the Yard-Man decision, the First Circuit faced a
similar issue.128 In Textron, the Steelworkers Union became embroiled in a
dispute with Textron, Inc. Textron sold a division to another company that
agreed to assume liability of the welfare benefits in question.129 The Union
requested that Textron guarantee the payment of benefits, and after Textron
refused, the Union filed a grievance seeking arbitration.130 In the meantime,
the new company paid the benefits for a few months, but stopped once it
experienced business problems.131
The Union successfully obtained a preliminary injunction requiring
Textron to pay for the benefits.132 The court noted one element that must be
shown when requesting a preliminary injunction is the likely success of the
party on the merits.133 While the court noted that Textron might be able to
succeed by showing an intent to terminate the benefits through the durational
language of the collective bargaining agreement, it cited with approval YardMan’s characterization of welfare benefits as “status” benefits.134 Because of
the strength of the Union’s argument using a Yard-Man analysis, the court held
that the preliminary injunction was properly granted.135

127. See Fox v. Varity Corp., No. 95-1730, 1996 WL 38227, at *2 (6th Cir. July 5, 1996)
(reviewing a preliminary injunction); International Union v. Loral Corp., No. 92-02391, 1997 WL
49077, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 3, 1997) (rejecting the employer’s argument that the inference could
only be used when the employer attempted to terminate, rather than modify, retirees’ welfare
benefits).
128. See United Steel Workers of Am. v. Textron, Inc., 836 F.2d 6, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1987).
Although the opinion is not an explicit affirmation of the Yard-Man inference, the case revolved
around the issue of whether a preliminary injunction was properly granted, and the relevant
standard is whether the moving party is likely to succeed on the merits.
129. See id. at 7.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Textron, 838 F.2d at 7 (citing Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641
F.2d 1006, 1009 (1st Cir. 1981)).
134. Id. at 9 (citing International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement
Workers of Am. v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1007 (1984)).
135. See id. at 10.
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In 1988, the Eleventh Circuit also joined in affirming the Yard-Man
analysis in United Steelworkers of America v. Connors Steel Co.136 Connors
Steel Company, a subsidiary of H.K. Porter, terminated retiree benefits that
had been provided since the execution of a collective bargaining agreement in
1974.137 Connors began encountering financial trouble in 1979.138 Each
collective bargaining agreement, signed during the relevant time periods, lasted
three years before being renegotiated.139 A Connors plant in Alabama was
unable to execute a collective bargaining agreement with the union to replace a
1980 agreement.140 In 1983, Connors notified retirees that it intended to cut
health insurance benefits upon the expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement in 1984.141
The provision that provided health insurance benefits for retirees was quite
clear as to the parties’ intent. It stated that the benefits were to be paid as long
as the retiree remained retired, “notwithstanding the expiration of [the
collective bargaining] agreement.”142 Thus, the case could have been decided
on the language alone.143 However, in dicta, the court went on to cite the
Yard-Man inference with approval.144 In general, the court stated that the
language here was much clearer than the language involved in Yard-Man.145
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the general duration of the
contract should not support a finding that retiree benefits expire with the
collective bargaining agreement, even when the language of the benefits
provision is ambiguous.146 The court emphatically stated: “We fully concur
with the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.”147
A year later, the Fourth Circuit joined the Sixth more explicitly.148 Keffer
v. H.K. Porter Co. involved the same parties with nearly identical facts as
Connors Steel.149 The only differences were the location of the plant and the
fact that the retirees brought suit rather than the union.150 Here, the retirees
were granted summary judgment in the district court, which held that the
136.
1988).
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Connors Steel, 855 F.2d 1499, 1504-05 (11th Cir.
See id. at 1500-01.
See id. at 1501.
See id.
See id.
See Connors Steel, 855 F.3d at 1501.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 1504-05.
See id.
See Connors Steel, 855 F.3d at 1505.
Id. at 1505.
See Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989).
See id. at 61.
See id.
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Steelworkers Union and H.K. Porter had intended the benefits to vest upon
retirement.151 The court also ruled that Connors was an agent of H.K. Porter,
and thus, H.K. Porter could be liable for Connors’ operation.152
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.153 The court first
focused on the language of the contract provisions specifying the benefits.154
Generally, the court found that the language supported the district court’s
conclusion that the parties intended the benefits to vest upon retirement.155
However, the circuit court then turned to Yard-Man stating that “[s]uch a
determination is also consistent with a more far-reaching understanding of the
context in which retiree benefits arise.”156
Just as the Yard-Man court reasoned, the Fourth Circuit indicated that it
would be ridiculous to presume that the benefits did not vest.157 After all,
employers and employees generally understand retiree benefits as deferred
forms of compensation. In addition, they are not mandatory subjects for
bargaining.158 Thus, no reasonable party to the contract would believe that the
compensation was to “be left to the contingencies of future negotiations.”159
Because the employees would want assurance that the deferred compensation
would come through when they retired, it is reasonable to presume that the
parties intended that the benefits vest upon retirement.160 The Fourth Circuit
went on to hold that because Connors Steel was an agent of H.K. Porter, H.K.
Porter was liable for the costs of the benefits.161
Thus, four circuits have provided affirmations of the inference. However,
just as quickly as the First, Fourth and Eleventh affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s
analysis, other circuits were quick to split and criticize the inference of vesting
benefits.
E.

The Formation of a Solid Split Among the Circuits

The first real criticism of Yard-Man came in 1988. The Eighth Circuit, in
Anderson v. Portland Indus., decided that it was “not at all inconsistent with
labor policy to require the plaintiffs to prove their case without the aid of

151. See id. at 62.
152. See id.
153. See Keffer, 872 F.2d at 65.
154. See id. at 62.
155. See id. at 63.
156. Id. at 64.
157. See id. (citing International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement
Workers of Am. v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1007 (1984)).
158. See Keffer, 872 F.2d at 64 (citing Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482).
159. Id. (citing Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482).
160. See id.
161. See id. at 65.
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gratuitous inferences.”162 In this case, retirees brought a class action suit
against their former employer, Alpha Portland.163 Alpha Portland provided
health care coverage since the 1950s.164 Many of the collective bargaining
agreements provided for rather explicit terms that allowed the employer to
terminate or modify health insurance after the collective bargaining agreement
providing those benefits expired.165 However, this case involved an added
element.
In 1974, Congress passed the Economic Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”). ERISA provides certain disclosure and vesting requirements for
benefits plans.166 However, while ERISA requires the vesting of pension
plans, it does not require the vesting of welfare benefits,167 which include life
and health insurance coverage.168 As stated above, the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement may bargain for vested benefits.169
In Anderson, the company and union negotiated their final collective
bargaining agreement in 1978.170 As part of ERISA’s requirements, a
summary plan description (“SPD”) was distributed to employees.171 The SPD
provided employees with ten years or more of service would continue to
receive health coverage for the remainder of their lives.172 However, previous
statements of that type had been understood by the company to mean that the
employee’s family would not receive the benefits in the event of the retiree’s
death.173 The language of the 1978 agreement was ambiguous at best, and
testimony revealed that a deceased company representative had indicated that
the benefits were to vest upon achieving ten years of service.174

162. Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus. Inc., 836 F.2d 1512, 1517 (8th Cir. 1988).
163. See id. at 1513.
164. See id. at 1513-14.
165. See id. at 1514. The language varied, but that “Alpha reserved ‘the right to change,
modify, or discontinue’ the plan” was a common provision from the beginning of the bargaining
relationship. See id.
166. See id. at 1516 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994)).
167. See Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1516 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994)).
168. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
169. See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984)
(citing John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 555 (1964)). In Livingston, Justice
Harlan wrote: “We see no reason why parties could not if they so chose agree to the accrual of
rights during the term of an agreement and their realization after the agreement had expired.”
Livingston, 376 U.S. at 555.
170. See Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1515.
171. See id.
172. See id. The SPD also provided that the company would continue to provide $4,000
yearly in life insurance. Id.
173. See id. at 1514.
174. See Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1515.
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In 1982, the agreement expired, and Alpha Portland was forced to close all
of its plants.175 In March, it notified retirees that their health and life insurance
benefits were to be terminated.176 Adding to the confusion, the union president
sent a letter informing retirees that the union’s hands were tied because health
insurance benefits did not vest under the last collective bargaining
agreement.177 Thus, the retirees brought suit in a class action without union
representation. The district court, in a bench trial, concluded that the benefits
had not vested and were vulnerable to termination by Alpha Portland.178
The court, once it determined that the provisions providing welfare
benefits to retirees were ambiguous as to vesting, turned to the intent of the
parties.179 The plaintiffs argued that the mere existence of welfare benefits
created a presumption that the benefits vested, and that the burden of proof
shifted to the employer to show clear language to the contrary.180 This
interpretation of Yard-Man then led the court to reject the idea of inferring
vested rights from the context of the collective bargaining agreement. First,
the court held that even if it “recognize[d] an inference in favor of vesting, the
burden of proof still remain[ed] on the plaintiffs. . . . Inferences do not shift the
burden of proof.”181
Next, the court rejected the favorable inference entirely.182 This argument
centered on the fact that ERISA explicitly exempted welfare benefits from its
vesting requirements.183 Because Congress demonstrated an explicit intent not
to allow the automatic vesting of welfare benefits, “it, therefore, seems
illogical to infer an intent to vest welfare benefits in every situation where an
employee is eligible to receive them on the day he retires.”184 Thus, the court
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 1515-16. Although it is pure speculation, this could be an example of the fear
of a union forced to drop retirees because of a need to work harder for active employees
expressed by Justice Brennan in Pittsburgh Plate Glass. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am.
v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 172-73 (1971).
178. See Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1513.
179. Id. at 1516.
180. See id. at 1516. This is a misread of Yard-Man. See supra notes 102-06 and
accompanying text. Yard-Man is clear that because the union does not have to bargain for these
rights, and the rights are normally understood to be deferred compensation, the court held that it
was not inconsistent with national labor policy to infer that the parties intended vested benefits.
See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v.
Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983). In fact, the court went on to say that no
“federal labor policy identified . . . presumptively favor [sic] the finding of interminable rights to
retiree insurance benefits when the collective bargaining agreement is silent. Id. Yard-Man only
established an inference rather than a presumption, which shifts the burden of proof. Id.
181. Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1517.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. Id.
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did not grant the plaintiffs a favorable inference. Instead, turning to the
language of earlier decisions of the Eighth Circuit, the court indicated that any
intent to vest the retirement benefits must be clear and specific from the
contract.185
The most recent rejection of the Yard-Man inference builds upon the
arguments of Anderson. However, the Third Circuit, in International Union v.
Skinner Engine Co., spent much more time dealing with the inference created
by Yard-Man.186 The U.A.W. executed collective bargaining agreements with
Skinner beginning in 1970.187 Each of the agreements provided that retirees
would continue to receive benefits after they retired, but they were silent as to
the duration.188 Likewise, all the collective bargaining agreements contained
general duration provisions that were normally three years in length.189
As in previous cases, Skinner ran into financial trouble, but not to the
extent that it was forced to shut down. In fact, the trouble would not have
arisen but for a decision made by the Financial Accounting and Standards
Board (“FASB”).190 The FASB issued an order, No. 106, in 1991.191 It
provided that companies would have to recognize the costs of post-retirement
benefits as employees rendered services rather than when they were paid.192
Thus, Skinner felt it financially wise to cut the benefits being paid to retirees
who were covered by collective bargaining agreements that had expired.193
The union and the retirees filed a class action against Skinner under § 301 of
the NLRMA.194
After the district court granted summary judgment to Skinner, the union
and retirees appealed to the Third Circuit.195 On August 10, 1999, the Third
Circuit handed down its decision explicitly rejecting any inferences in favor of
vested rights.196 Like the Eighth Circuit in Anderson, the court followed YardMan’s analysis of the provisions until arriving at the union’s argument that the
benefits raised an inference that they were vested.197

185. See id. (citing Anderson v. John Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872, 877 (8th Cir. 1987) and
UFCW Local 105-A v. Dubuque Packing Co., 756 F.2d 66, 70 (8th Cir. 1985)).
186. See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.
v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 139-41 (3rd Cir. 1999).
187. See id. at 134.
188. See id. at 135.
189. See id.
190. Id.
191. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 136.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 136-37.
195. See id.
196. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 142.
197. See id. at 137-39.
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Unlike the Anderson court, however, the Third Circuit divided the YardMan inference into two parts. First, the Sixth Circuit, according to the Skinner
court, had rested its decision on the fact that retirement benefits are ordinarily
vested because the benefit terms are only permissive and take the form of
deferred compensation.198 Thus, the parties would not logically intend to leave
them to the uncertain contingency of negotiation.199 Next, the court claimed
that the Sixth Circuit had created a presumption in favor of vested rights to
welfare benefits because the Yard-Man court had declared them to be “status”
benefits.200
The court quickly rejected any notion of a presumption. The argument
against a presumption that shifted the burden of proof was based on the Eighth
Circuit’s argument that ERISA’s explicit exemption of welfare benefits from
its vesting requirements precluded a presumption that parties intended the
benefits to vest.201 In fact, the court went so far as to say that “because vesting
of welfare benefits constitutes an extra-ERISA commitment, an employer’s
commitment to vest such benefits is not to be inferred lightly and must be
stated in clear and express language.”202
The court went on to reject the argument that because the provisions were
only permissive, rather than mandatory, the court should infer that the parties
intended the benefits to vest.203 Here, the court turned to the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Bidlack v. Wheelabrator.204
In Bidlack, the Seventh Circuit faced a similar issue involving retiree
welfare benefits, but the court did not directly address the Yard-Man
inference.205 Instead, the court reasoned, in an opinion by Judge Richard
Posner, that in one sense, one could argue that the benefits should not vest
because the union would never bargain for retiree benefits.206 It would have no
reason to do so because the retirees did not pay benefits or contribute to the
union.207 One could also argue that because the current employees that will
retire under the current collective bargaining agreement would want the
benefits to vest, they would have lobbied the union to bargain for vested
198. See id. at 140.
199. See id. (citing International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement
Workers of Am. v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1007 (1984)).
200. Id.
201. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 140-41.
202. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
203. See id. at 141.
204. See id. (citing Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc)).
It should not be overlooked that this opinion was written by the founder of law and economics,
Judge Richard Posner.
205. See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 609-10.
206. See id. at 609.
207. See id.
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benefits.208 Thus, the parties could have intended vested benefits.209 Because
the contract was ambiguous and the intent of the parties unclear, the Seventh
Circuit refused to grant summary judgment to either party and remanded the
case for a jury to make the determination.210
The Third Circuit, rather than remanding for a jury determination, used
Posner’s argument to support its position that the Yard-Man inference should
not be used in determining the parties’ intent.211 In either of Posner’s
situations, the Third Circuit indicated that the current employees have the
burden to lobby the union for vested benefits.212 Thus, if the language is not
clear, the benefits should not vest.213 After applying general contract
principles, the court held that the parties did not intend the benefits to vest
upon retirement and granted summary judgment in favor of Skinner.214
This decision has created a solid split among the U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals. Because the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue, litigants
are forced to fit their case within the law of the particular circuit in which they
lie.215
The background that has been provided in Section II of this Comment will
serve in understanding the analysis. Not only are the principles of law
established in each case important to the analysis, but the facts of the cases are
also important. The combination of facts and law show that the Yard-Man

208. See id.
209. See id. at 610.
210. See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 609. Judge Posner based his decision not to infer vested rights
on grounds that a jury would be best suited to resolve a dispute over the parties’ intent. Id. “Only
a posture, not easy to reconcile with the Seventh Amendment, of extreme mistrust of juries would
entitle us to permit a factual inquiry and apply an interpretive canon or other tie-breaker before
we know that the sides are actually tied.” Id.
211. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 141.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 147. The court then rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the employer breached
its fiduciary duty under ERISA. See id. at 147-51. Finally, the court rejected an argument based
on equitable estoppel. See id. at 151-52. These latter analyses will be further discussed when
evaluating alternative arguments upon which retirees may rest a claim when their welfare benefits
are unilaterally terminated or modified.
215. See Duffy, supra note 8, at 1. The Skinner decision could ultimately be determined by
the U.S. Supreme Court thus settling the rule unless Congress makes a determination that a
statute is necessary. Id. The Supreme Court has held that an employer that is not subject to a
collective bargaining agreement may provide for the amendment of welfare benefits using a
standard provision in the ERISA summary plan description. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73 (1995). The Court has also noted that the courts may find that
parties provided for vested benefits through contractual interpretation. Litton Fin. Printing Div.
v. N.L.R.B., 501 U.S. 190, 207-08 (1991). The Court has not ruled on the issue of whether an
employer may alter or terminate welfare benefits provided for in a collective bargaining
agreement. Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes, 73 F.3d 648, 655-56 (6th Cir. 1996).
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principle should not be scrapped by the courts until some better alternative is
established in the way of legislation.
III. YARD-MAN’S UNFOUNDED CRITICISM
The Yard-Man decision has been criticized by both the courts and the
commentators.216 Now that the background of the issue has been discussed, it
will be helpful to analyze common criticisms of the Sixth Circuit’s decision.
Each criticism, whether it originates in the courts or in commentary, will be
evaluated with a focus on showing that the inference is not inconsistent with
solid legal principles. In addition, any problem with the inference is
overshadowed by a retiree’s loss of health care coverage or life insurance when
that retiree had expected the benefits to vest upon retirement. As will be
demonstrated, the criticisms do not require the elimination of the principle and
are generally outweighed by the inference’s necessity.
A.

Criticism in the Courts

It has already been shown that the criticism of Yard-Man began in the
Eighth Circuit with Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus.217 There, the Eighth
Circuit’s main criticism of the inference was that the retirees should not be
afforded a “gratuitous inference” because it cut against the congressional intent
in passing ERISA without vesting requirements for welfare benefits. 218 The
court stated that because Congress explicitly exempted welfare benefits from
the vesting requirements, “[i]t . . . seems illogical to infer an intent to vest
welfare benefits in every situation where an employee is eligible to receive
them on the day he retires.”219
The Third Circuit adopted an identical argument in Skinner.220 The court,
after quoting Anderson’s language, stated that “we echo these concerns and
add that the Yard-Man inference may be contrary to Congress’ intent in
choosing specifically not to provide for the vesting of employee welfare
benefits.”221

216. See generally Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus. Inc., 836 F.2d 1512 (8th Cir. 1988);
Skinner, 188 F.3d at 140; and Gregory Parker Rogers, Rethinking Yard-Man: A Return to
Fundamental Contract Principles in Retiree Benefits Litigation, 37 EMORY L.J. 1033 (1988); Cf.
Weckstein, supra note 38, at 132 (arguing that legislation is needed to protect such benefits, but
that a presumption against vesting benefits should be used by the courts until such legislation is
adopted).
217. See Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1517.
218. Id. ERISA’s vesting requirements “shall apply to any employee benefit plan described
in section 4(a) . . . other than an employee welfare benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (1994).
219. Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1517.
220. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 141.
221. Id. (citing Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1517).
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This ERISA-based argument appears to be a strong argument at first
glance. The legislative history of the statute indicates that Congress feared that
by allowing health insurance benefits to vest, it would cause the costs of such
insurance to rise.222 In that case, no employer would even attempt to purchase
such benefits. However, after examining the language of ERISA and
considering what the Yard-Man court really held, the criticism of the Eighth
and Third Circuits is less convincing.
The language of ERISA explicitly states that Congress found that “despite
the enormous growth in [pension benefit] plans many employees with long
years of employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the
lack of vesting provisions in such plans.”223 The statute goes on to say “that
owing to the termination of plans before requisite funds have been
accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived of
anticipated benefits.”224 To remedy these situations in which retirees and their
families unexpectedly lose benefits, ERISA proposed disclosure and vesting
requirements.225 The disclosure requirements apply to health and life
insurance benefits, but these “welfare benefits” are excluded from the vesting
requirements.226
Retirees obtain these benefits as employees and often believe that they are
to last a lifetime.227 Unlike Anderson and Skinner, where it did not appear that
the retirees ever believed the benefits were to vest, a more recent case from the
Eighth Circuit provides a more shocking result.228 In John Morrell & Co. v.
United Food and Commercial Workers Int’l Union, the collective bargaining
agreement and ERISA documents varied greatly from term to term.229 At least
some of the agreements provided that if the retiree died, the coverage was to
last for the lifetime of the retiree’s spouse until he or she died or remarried.230
Even though the language seemed clear, the company was able to point to

222. See S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 51 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4935 (“To
require the vesting of these ancillary benefits would seriously complicate the administration and
increase the cost of plans whose primary function is to provide retirement income.”).
223. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994).
224. Id.
225. See id. § 1001(b), (c).
226. Compare id. § 1021 with § 1051(a).
227. See, e.g., Anderson, 838 F.2d at 1515; Skinner, 188 F.3d at 147; John Morrell & Co. v.
United Food and Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 37 F.3d 1302, 1313-14 (8th Cir. 1994)
(Heaney, J., dissenting) (suggesting the retirees never objected when the company changed the
benefits in each collective bargaining agreement signed because they believed that their right to
health benefits previously conferred had not been diminished).
228. See John Morrell & Co., 37 F.3d at 1303-08.
229. See id. at 1303-07.
230. See id. at 1307.
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other language creating an ambiguity.231 The court, citing to Anderson, found
that the language of the collective bargaining agreements and ERISA
documents did not show an intention of the parties to provide for vesting
benefits.232
While it must be conceded that ERISA does not require these benefits to
vest, the inference is not antithetical to ERISA. 233 In addition, the Eighth
Circuit misinterpreted the Yard-Man inference when applying the argument
that ERISA prevents any “gratuitous inference.”234 In Anderson, the court
began by rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that Yard-Man provided for a
presumption in favor of vesting benefits.235 In fact, Yard-Man does not
provide for such a presumption.236 The Sixth Circuit insisted that there was
not a presumption.237 Rather, the benefits were classified as “status benefits”
and in light of the other evidence, the court indicated that such “status
benefits” would raise an inference that the parties intended the benefits to
vest.238 Thus, the retirees still maintained the burden of proof in showing that
the parties intended the benefits to vest.239
The Eighth Circuit then went on to make its argument that because ERISA
explicitly exempts welfare benefits from vesting, it would be “illogical to infer
an intent to vest welfare benefits in every situation where an employee is
eligible to receive them on the day he retires.”240 The court indicated that
Yard-Man created the presumption that it had previously insisted was not part

231. See id. In particular, the court pointed out that the provisions of each collective
bargaining agreement lacked explicit language vesting welfare benefits while pension benefits
were explicitly vested. See id.
232. See id. at 1308. In addition, the court refused to find that Morrell breached its fiduciary
duty under ERISA because ERISA does not prevent the employer from exercising business
judgment, even if the employer is also acting as fiduciary under the statute. See id.
233. See 29 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (1994).
234. See Anderson, 838 F.2d at 1517.
235. See id. at 1516-17.
236. See International Union, United Auto, Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am.
v. Yard-Man, Inc. 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983); supra notes 104-108 and accompanying
text.
237. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
238. Id. Standing alone, the “status benefits” would not be sufficient to create the inference
that the parties intended the benefits to vest. Id.
239. See id. It has been argued that the practical effect of the inference is to create a
presumption and shift the burden of proof. Melbinger & Culver, supra note 104, at 147.
However, while the burden of production may switch to the employer once evidence has been
shown to establish the inference, the burden of proof remains with the retirees to show that more
likely than not the benefits were intended to vest. In reality, this situation is no different from any
breach of contract case in which the plaintiff establishes the parties’ intent.
240. Anderson, 838 F.2d at 1517.
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of Yard-Man’s holding.241 Yard-Man never held that benefits should vest in
every case.242 Rather, it was clear that the existence of “status benefits” alone
would not be enough to even create the inference.243 Yard-Man stood for
establishing an inference by looking at the context of the agreement.244 The
fact that the benefits were welfare benefits was simply another factor to be
considered in establishing that inference.245 While the congressional intent of
ERISA may cut against the idea of a presumption of vested benefits, it
certainly does not prevent establishing an inference such as this.
In light of this interpretation of Yard-Man, it is no longer “illogical to infer
an intent to vest,” even with the exemption of welfare benefits under ERISA’s
vesting requirements. Instead, such an inference is consistent with Congress’
intent to “protect . . . the interests of participants in private pension plans and
their beneficiaries by improving the equitable character and the soundness of
such plans by requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of the employees.”246
The next criticism used by the courts rejecting the Yard-Man inference is
not as much a criticism than it is an argument against the inference. The Third
Circuit used it to decide Skinner.247 The Third Circuit began with Judge
Posner’s position in Bidlack that one could argue that the union would never
have intended vested benefits since retirees are not in the union and pay no
dues (i.e. the union would get no benefit).248 However, one could also argue
that because the employees know they will not be protected by the union, nor
the NLRA once they retire, they would never intend anything but vested
benefits upon retirement.249 Leaving the benefits open to change would leave
retirees without protection against the company’s whims. Judge Posner
concluded that because both arguments could be made, no judicial

241. See id. at 1516-17. First, the court reasoned that the Sixth Circuit only created an
inference in Yard-Man to defeat the plaintiff’s argument that welfare benefits created a
presumption of vested benefits. See id. Then, it stated that it would be “illogical to infer” vested
benefits in every case. Id. at 1517. That is, the court seemed to indicate that it would be illogical
to allow the benefits alone to create a presumption of vesting. See id.
242. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See id. “Rather, as part of the context from which the collective bargaining agreement
arose, the nature of such benefits simply provides another inference of intent.” Id. This was not
the result of any special presumption, but rather, a result of the reasoning that the benefits, as
deferred compensation, would not have been left to the irregularities of future bargaining. See id.
246. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1994).
247. See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.
v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 140-41 (3rd Cir. 1999).
248. See Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
249. See id.
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determination could be made as a matter of law.250 Rather, the Seventh Circuit
in Bidlack remanded the case to a jury.251
The Third Circuit reasoned differently.252 Instead of finding that both
arguments were reasonable in determining the intent of the parties, the Third
Circuit decided that if the parties really intended vesting benefits, then the
language would be clear.253 If the employees knew that they would lose union
protection upon retirement, then they “need only see to it that specific vesting
language protecting [welfare benefits] is incorporated into the collective
bargaining agreement.”254 Thus, there is no need for an inference or
presumption because the employees have the burden of incorporating the
proper language into the contract.255
The problem with this argument is that it assumes that the employees, via
the union, knew what type of language to incorporate into the contract. It
starts with the proposition that if they had wanted the benefits to vest, the
language would be there to make that happen.256 The chances are equally
strong, if not stronger, that the employees, leaving such technicalities to the
union, thought they were getting vested benefits.257 They may or may not have
lobbied their union to obtain vested benefits, and upon reading the ambiguous
language of the collective bargaining agreement and ERISA documents,
thought that the union was successful.258 Demanding that the retirees show
clear language makes for an efficient bright-line rule because it allows a
determination to be made on the face of the collective bargaining agreement.
However, it will certainly provide for harsh results in situations in which the
retirees had believed they were to receive vested benefits and relied on that
belief.

250. See id. at 609-10.
251. See id. at 610.
252. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 141.
253. See id.
254. Id.
255. See id. at 141-42.
256. See id. at 141. Employees who want the union to bargain for continued benefits for
retirees should include “specific language protecting those benefits” in the collective bargaining
agreement. Id. This is illogical for another reason. The employee cannot “see to it” that the
language will be placed into the agreement. The union is the exclusive representative for the
employee bargaining unit. If the employer were to deal with the employee directly, it would
violate § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.
257. See John Morrell & Co. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 37 F.3d
1302, 1313-14 (8th Cir. 1994) (Heaney, J., dissenting). Here the retirees and their spouses
testified that they believed that the benefits were to last a lifetime and cover a retiree’s spouse in
the event that the retiree died. See id. at 1310.
258. See id. at 1313-14.
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This rule eliminates the need to search for the parties’ intent.259 Each time
a court determines that the language of the collective bargaining agreement is
ambiguous, it would be impossible for the retirees to show that the parties
intended vested benefits. The Third Circuit actually creates a presumption that
the parties did not intend vested benefits.260 Much like a presumption favoring
vested benefits in every case, this opposite extreme is unconscionable. Not
only does it throw out Yard-Man’s inference, it throws out traditional
contractual interpretation.261
While some courts have not been friendly to the Yard-Man inference, the
criticism continued in the commentary following the initial decision.262 Some
of these criticisms present valid points, but none successfully present an
argument against using an inference as an added factor in deciding the intent of
the parties.
B.

Criticisms from Academic Commentary

Donald Weckstein, an expert in labor and collective bargaining issues,
criticized the congressional response to the problems of non-vesting
benefits.263 However, he was quick to criticize Yard-Man despite his concern
for protecting retirees and their needed welfare benefits.264 He accepted the
public policy needs for an inference as created in Yard-Man, but attacked the
deferred compensation analysis.265
Weckstein reasoned that the Yard-Man court was correct in concluding
that sometimes retiree health benefits are taken in lieu of additional
compensation such as wages or immediate benefits.266 He went on to argue,
however, that “the current employees may not have acted on the assumption
that, once granted, retiree health and welfare benefits may not be reconsidered

259. See generally International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement
Workers of Am. v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1983) (explaining that once
it has been established that a contract is ambiguous, the court should then seek to discern the
intent of the parties).
260. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 141. See also Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp. 493 F.2d 603, 607
(7th Cir. 1993). In Bidlack, the court refused to establish a rule requiring clear language to
establish vested benefits. See id. “[C]ourts should be cautious about adding formal hoops that
contract parties must jump through. . . .” Id.
261. See generally Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479-80. The Sixth Circuit clearly presented the
traditional contract principles needed for the analysis. See id. See also notes 74-81 and
accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., Weckstein, supra note 38, at 128-32; Rogers, supra note 216, at 1054-56.
263. See Weckstein, supra note 38, at 133-36. Weckstein indicated that Congress had made
“step[s] in the right direction, but [Congress was] still a long way from a solution.” Id. at 135.
264. See id. at 130-32, 134.
265. See id. at 128-31.
266. See id. at 130.
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at future bargaining sessions when conditions have changed.”267 Thus, the
deferred compensation analysis requires the court to assume too much
regarding the union’s and employees’ intent.268
Weckstein then turned his attention to the Weimer court’s use of this
analysis.269 There, the Sixth Circuit made the statement that because the
benefits were viewed as deferred compensation, and because the parties could
not have left them to the uncertainties of future bargaining, the welfare benefits
were normally vested.270 Weckstein insisted that Yard-Man never stood for
such an analysis.271 He insisted that this expands Yard-Man and “ignores the
statutory distinction made in ERISA . . . between pension retirement benefits,
which do normally vest, and welfare retirement benefits which do not vest
absent a contractual undertaking of that nature.”272
First, Weckstein is correct that the statement from Weimer is an undue
expansion of the Yard-Man inference.273 This statement may be the reason
why the courts have dismissed Yard-Man as a presumption rather than a mere
inference to be considered with other factors in determining intent.274
However, it has already been shown that the Weimer court, while making such
a statement, really continued to apply the Yard-Man inference correctly.275
That is, it considered it in addition to other factors in determining that the
parties intended the benefits to vest.276
Next, Weckstein raised a valid point in regard to the deferred
compensation analysis, but his attack was too extreme.277 Perhaps a party
would be willing to accept benefits left to the uncertainties of later
bargaining.278 Indeed, the union may not have been able to obtain the vested
language from the employer. If this is the case, then the interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement raises the possibility of an illusory
provision.279 The courts have always shied away from interpreting an

267. Id.
268. See generally Weckstein, supra note 38, at 130 (“The difficulty with this analysis is that
it proves too much, some of which does not logically follow.”).
269. See id. at 131.
270. Id. (citing Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 773 F.2d 669, 672 (6th Cir. 1985)).
271. See id. After quoting from Weimer, Weckstein insisted that “Yard-Man did not make
any such statement.” Id.
272. Id.
273. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
274. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 140. “We cannot agree with Yard-Man and its progeny that
there exists a presumption of lifetime benefits in the context of employee welfare benefits.” Id.
275. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
277. See Weckstein, supra note 38, at 130.
278. See id. (citing Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482 n.8).
279. See generally, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214-15 (N.Y.
1917). It is conceded that providing some benefits is better than no benefits. However, there is
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agreement in such a way because it is difficult to believe that any party would
engage in such a one-sided deal.280 Thus, the deferred compensation analysis,
though requiring the court to assume that parties would not enter into a onesided agreement, is not so unreasonable as to avoid using it. In addition, any
questionable assumption is outweighed by the courts’ use of other factors in
determining the parties’ intent. Again, the Yard-Man inference was only one
factor among many pointing to an intent to vest benefits. 281
The courts and commentators have been creative in attacking Yard-Man’s
analysis. At the same time, very little has been suggested as an alternative to
avoiding the harsh results that are possible when the inference is not used.
Alternatives that have been suggested do not prevent unconscionable results or
have not been adopted by the courts or legislatures.
IV. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF CURRENT ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO
RETIREES
Perhaps the best argument for preserving the Yard-Man decision is that any
alternative analyses of problems involving the termination of welfare benefits
are insufficient to protect the interest of the parties. Current judicial
alternatives range from requiring specific language formulae282 to using pure
contractual analyses such as equitable estoppel.283 As with the criticism of
Yard-Man, a cross-section of these alternatives will be evaluated based on their
ability to provide efficient results, protect the retirees and protect the ability of
employers to continue providing benefits to retirees.

nothing keeping an employer in the Third and Eighth Circuits from terminating the welfare
benefits being paid to retirees immediately upon termination of the collective bargaining
agreement. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 140-41; Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus. Inc., 836 F.2d
1512, 1517 (8th Cir. 1988). While some of the current employees covered by the pertinent
collective bargaining agreement will retire during the term of the agreement, other employees,
perhaps even a majority, that presumably gave up the same compensation, would never see the
compensation deferred to retirement. It is not being argued that employers must grant vested
benefits in every case. Rather, the employees should not be misled into believing that they are
receiving lifetime benefits when they are not. The deferred compensation analysis is only part of
the reasoning in raising the inference. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482. Ultimately, it is only a
single part of the Yard-Man analysis. Id.
280. Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 493 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 1993). The Seventh Circuit
used this to reason that courts will, on occasion, look outside the terms of the contract to imply
meaning. Id.
281. The Yard-Man court used a number of factors in determining that the parties must have
intended the benefits to vest. See supra notes 61-108 and accompanying text.
282. See, e.g., Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 607.
283. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 151-52; Rogers, supra note 216, at 1072-74. See also
Melbinger & Culver, supra note 104, at 150-152.
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Language Formulae

In approaching a situation in which an employer has terminated welfare
benefits, a court may consider a number of possibilities for analysis.284 While
it is has not been a choice, even for the courts most skeptical of retiree claims,
one of these possibilities is requiring specific language in order to vest
benefits.285 That is, a court may hold that there will not be vested benefits
unless the collective bargaining agreement uses the words, “vested benefits” or
“benefits for the life of the retiree.” If this was the case, retirees would seldom
be able to bring a claim under § 301 of the NLRMA.286 The outcome of any
case could be pre-determined.
This analysis would provide efficient results. The courts could decide a
claim without considering the role and impact of a jury in the proceedings.287
Judges could rule as a matter of law because they would need to only look for
the prescribed formula. If that formula was not present, then the retirees could
not succeed under § 301.
This efficiency is outweighed by the harsh results generated by such
formalism. Even when the language indicates that welfare benefits are to vest,
the retirees could not recover unless the prescribed formula was present. In
Bidlack, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, “[i]t is one thing for a court to lay down
default rules to solve contractual disputes when the parties’ intentions cannot
be determined. . . . It is another thing for us to say to the contract parties, we
can see what you’re driving at but as you have not used our preferred form of
words we shall not enforce your contract.”288
The courts developed the idea of consideration to show that the contract
should be enforced rather than prescribed formulae.289 Even if it is apparent
that the parties did not intend vested benefits, the collective bargaining
agreement is enforceable because the current employees are providing
consideration through their labor. Thus, requiring specific words for the
benefits to vest is simply not appropriate.290

284. See, e.g., Melbinger & Culver, supra note 104, at 145-52. Melbinger and Culver
consider six different analyses, but draw no conclusions. Id. Rather, their article was merely a
survey of the status of the issue in the early 1990s. Id.
285. See generally Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 607. The Seventh Circuit eventually rejected this
analysis as an extreme position. Id.
286. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994).
287. See generally Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 607-09 (rejecting this analysis, a presumption in favor
of vested benefits, and remanding the case for a jury to decide).
288. Id. at 607.
289. See id.
290. See id.
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Equitable Estoppel

Another option available to the courts would be to use a pure contractual
analysis.291 Some of the commentators and courts have suggested that
equitable estoppel is sufficient to protect the retirees and provide for efficient
results.292
Often employers become confused after they leave the bargaining table.
The negotiators may not have intended for the benefits to vest. At a
subsequent time, some authorized agent of the employer will explain to
employees subject to the collective bargaining agreement that they have been
provided with lifetime welfare benefits.293 Another common occurrence is that
the employer continues to provide welfare benefits to retirees for years after
the collective bargaining agreement in question has expired.294
In an argument criticizing the Yard-Man analysis, Gregory Parker Rogers
argued that equitable estoppel was a “rational alternative” to the “strained
contract interpretation” of Yard-Man.295 Thus, if an employee reasonably
relies on a promise of lifetime benefits from a company agent, then the
employer should be “estopped from standing on the contract terms.”296 The
only danger pointed out by Rogers is in avoiding the enforcement of promises
on which no reasonable person would rely.297
Unfortunately, when this analysis is applied to real situations, the results
are sometimes too harsh. For example, in a case involving an employer who
unilaterally terminated medical benefits, the Third Circuit discussed the
possibility of an equitable estoppel analysis.298 In In re Unisys Corp. Retiree
Med Benefit “ERISA” Litig, the retirees were denied recovery under equitable
estoppel.299 In that case, the company distributed summary plan descriptions
pursuant to ERISA § 1021(a)300 which contained a provision reserving the
291. See Melbinger & Culver, supra note 104, at 150-52.
292. See Rogers, supra note 216, at 1072-74.
293. See id. at 1072.
294. See John Morrell & Co. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 37 F.3d
1302, 1305-06 (8th Cir. 1994). John Morrell & Co. went so far as to continue providing retirees
with health insurance benefits even when the union went on strike and welfare benefits were
terminated for active employees. Id. at 1306. The Eighth Circuit did not use an equitable
estoppel analysis however. See id. at 1302-07.
295. Rogers, supra note 216, at 1072.
296. Id. at 1073.
297. See id.
298. In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit “ERISA” Litig., 58 F.3d 896, 907 (3rd Cir.
1995). In this case, the court dealt only with ERISA and did not address a Yard-Man analysis
because there was no collective bargaining agreement involved. See id. at 898-900. Instead, the
retirees claimed to have relied on words in the summary plan description, which indicated the
benefits would be vested “for life.” Id. at 898.
299. See id. at 908.
300. 29 U.S.C. § 1021(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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right to terminate in the employer, but also included words indicating that the
benefits were “for life.”301
The court listed the elements of equitable estoppel.302 The plaintiff had to
show a material misrepresentation on the part of the company and reasonable,
detrimental reliance on that misrepresentation.303 Because of the provision in
the summary plan description reserving the right to terminate, the court
determined that the retirees could not have reasonably relied on the other
language.304 The court stated: “While we acknowledge that many retirees may
have relied to their detriment on their interpretation of the summary plan
descriptions as promising vested or lifetime benefits, we nonetheless must
reject their estoppel claim.”305
Likewise, in Skinner, the Third Circuit concluded that the retirees could
not recover under equitable estoppel.306 In this case, the retirees had failed to
show detrimental reliance or other extraordinary circumstances.307 As the
court noted, “[h]ere, the appellants have presented no evidence which supports
an inference of bad faith and/or fraudulent conduct on the part of the
[employer], misrepresentations over an extended course of dealing, or the
particular vulnerability of the appellants.”308
Showing reliance on company promises is almost impossible. The reliance
must be reasonable.309 Thus, it is almost necessary for a retiree to be told by a
company executive during an exit interview that welfare benefits are to last a
lifetime in order to pursue a claim under equitable estoppel.310 Though there
are probably no studies dealing with this issue, it is likely that companies
seldom send top executives to conduct exit interviews, but that does not mean
a retiree does not reasonably rely on what he or she is told.311
Likewise, it is also difficult to show reasonable reliance on language in a
summary plan description. A retiree could not make an argument of
reasonable reliance unless the documents were clear that the benefits were to
301. See Unisys, 58 F.3d at 898.
302. See id. at 907 (citing Curcio v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 235 (3rd Cir.
1994)); Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131, 137 (3rd Cir. 1993)).
303. See id.
304. See id.
305. Id.
306. See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.
v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 152 (3rd Cir. 1999).
307. See id.
308. Id.
309. See Unisys, 58 F.3d at 907; Skinner, 188 F.3d at 151 (citing Unisys, 58 F.3d at 907;
Curcio, 33 F.3d at 235).
310. See Rogers, supra note 216, at 1073.
311. “Courts must be careful . . . not to enforce promises on which no reasonable person
would rely. If the [person conducting an exit interview] has no such authority [to explain that
benefits are to last a lifetime], then retirees should not rely on these promises.” Id.
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vest.312 If the description contained conflicting language, then the retiree was
not reasonable in relying on words that do indicate lifetime benefits.313 Thus,
the summary plan description would have to be clear in providing vested
benefits. It is then questionable whether or not a retiree could reasonably rely
on such language if a separate document (i.e. a collective bargaining
agreement) contained conflicting language.314 Regardless, the employer will
almost always be able to create an argument against the reasonable reliance of
the retiree. “Clear language addressed to the employer’s right to terminate or
modify its obligation to continue health and welfare benefits for retirees . . . is
the exception. And even when it does occur, other actions or language of the
employer may create an ambiguity.”315
While the efficiency of the equitable estoppel analysis is not a problem, it
simply is not sufficient to protect the retirees from harsh consequences. The
union conducts negotiations in lieu of the employees.316 If the employees had
directly negotiated with the employer and settled on the contract provisions,
then maybe the equitable estoppel analysis would make more sense.317
Instead, the employee, who will later be the retiree, is left to rely on what the
union and company tells the employees regarding the status of welfare benefits
under a collective bargaining agreement. Still, once the bargaining agreement
is executed, the employees are held to the terms of the agreement, even if they
disagree with the terms.318 Thus, a retiree could seldom satisfy the reasonable
reliance requirement of equitable estoppel, even if there was actual reliance on

312. See Unisys, 58 F.3d at 907-08.
313. See id. at 907.
314. Skinner would suggest that an employee cannot reasonably rely upon language in one
document when there is language in another indicating that the company reserved the right to
terminate the benefits. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 151-52. However, Skinner does not provide a
clear answer because, while there was language in the summary plan descriptions reserving a
right to terminate, the summary plan descriptions were never distributed to the employees or
retirees. See id. at 152. Thus, the court instead decided that equitable estoppel was not possible
because there was no evidence of reliance on the language in the collective bargaining agreement
indicating that benefits were vested and there were no extraordinary circumstances. See id.
315. See Weckstein, supra note 38, at 120.
316. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994).
317. In that situation, there would be a reason to consider reliance on language unreasonable
when there is conflicting language. However, when the union negotiates, the employees cannot
be expected to be experts on the language of the collective bargaining agreement and ERISA
documents. That’s what they select the union to do. Id.
318. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 65-70 (1975).
The Supreme Court has held that the employees are bound by the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement even if they are challenging the employer’s discriminatory practices. Id.
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the words of the employer, summary plan description, or collective bargaining
agreement.319
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under ERISA
The final analysis to be evaluated has also been discussed by courts
rejecting Yard-Man. This analysis is based on the creation of a fiduciary duty
under ERISA. When an employer establishes a benefits plan, it must be
administered under ERISA.320 The administrator maintains a fiduciary duty to
the plan participants.321 Thus, the employer may actually have a double
relationship with the employees under a plan: employer-employee and a
fiduciary relationship.322
A fiduciary must discharge the plan only in the interest of the
participants.323 The argument presented by retirees having their benefits
terminated is that the employer breached its fiduciary duties when it led them
to believe that they were receiving a vested benefit.324 The courts generally
hold that an employer who affirmatively misleads plan participants breaches
the fiduciary duty required by ERISA.325 The retirees can argue that they were
affirmatively misled, and thus, the employer acted to the detriment of the plan
participants in allowing the retirees to believe the benefits were vested when
they were not.326
It would appear that this presents a safety valve, eliminating the need for
the Yard-Man inference. After all, ERISA was meant to cover and protect
pension and benefit plans.
Retirees pursuing this route have been
unsuccessful.327 Even presuming a retiree could show that the employer

319. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 151; Unisys, 58 F.3d at 907; Gordon v. Barnes Pumps, Inc., 999
F.2d 133, 137 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that all the plan participants should have known that the
employer could modify the terms according to the provisions of the plan).
320. See Janilyn S. Brouwer, Retiree Health Benefits: The Promise of a Lifetime? 51 OHIO
ST. L.J. 985, 990 (1990).
321. See id. A fiduciary is anyone who “exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary
control respecting management of [a benefits] plan or exercises any authority or control
respecting management or disposition of its assets.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994).
322. See Amato v. Western Union Int’l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1416 (2nd Cir. 1985); Fischer v.
Phila. Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 133 (3rd Cir. 1993).
323. See 29 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1) (1994); Skinner, 188 F.3d at 148.
324. See Ossi, supra note 55, at 248.
325. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 148. Generally, to make out a claim for breach of a fiduciary
duty, the Third Circuit requires a showing of: (1) the employer acted as a fiduciary, (2) the
employer/fiduciary made affirmative misrepresentations, (3) the fiduciary knew it was confusing
participants, and (4) the participants were harmed. Id.
326. See Brouwer, supra note 320, at 991.
327. See id. See also Ossi, supra note 55, at 248 (arguing that retirees are unsuccessful with
this analysis with or without provisions expressly providing for the employer’s reserved right to
amend or terminate the benefit).
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misled the plan participants without showing the benefits are actually vested,
the courts, through interpretation of the fiduciary duty and ERISA
requirements, have made it nearly impossible to obtain equitable relief under
the fiduciary duty analysis.328 Generally, to raise a breach of fiduciary duty,
retirees would have to show that the employer misled them into believing that
benefits were vested, and then terminated the benefits.
First, in Amato v. Western Union Int’l, the Second Circuit allowed the
employer to distinguish acts committed as the fiduciary and acts committed as
the employer.329 In general, an employer should not be prevented from
deciding what benefits are to confer.330 Thus, if the employer decides not to
confer any benefits, the employee has no recourse.331 This is a decision
employers are allowed to make. Likewise, if the employer decides to modify
benefits that have not been vested, then the employer has not breached a
fiduciary duty because the employer has not acted as a plan administrator and
owes no fiduciary duty.332 Because of this precedent, retirees could not claim
breach of the fiduciary duty for simply terminating the benefits.333 In addition,
to argue that the employer breached a fiduciary duty by cutting or modifying
benefits that were vested begs the question of whether the benefits were vested
in the first place. The question of the Yard-Man inference would still be
unresolved.
In order to state a cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty, the courts
have created elements that make it just as difficult to bring it as a claim under
equitable estoppel.334 In fact, the courts look for many of the same elements to
establish both.335 In Skinner, the court listed the elements needed to bring a
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.336 One of the elements that must be
shown is that the “company made affirmative misrepresentations or failed to
adequately inform plan participants and beneficiaries.”337
In Skinner, the court refused to find an affirmative misrepresentation even
though the employees actually believed the benefits were to vest under the
328. See supra notes 324-27.
329. See Amato, 773 F.2d at 1416; Brouwer, supra note 320, at 991.
330. See id. at 991.
331. See id.
332. See id. at 991-92.
333. If an employer decides to cut welfare benefits, a fiduciary duty claim cannot be brought
because the employer was not acting as the plan administrator when the benefits were cut. See id.
at 991. “The courts have decided that modifying the terms of employee benefit plans is an
‘employer’ function.” Id.
334. See supra notes 291-319 and accompanying text.
335. Compare supra notes 291-319 and accompanying text with supra notes 320-36 and
accompanying text.
336. See supra note 325.
337. International Union, United Auto., Acrospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v.
Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 148 (3rd Cir. 1999).
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plan.338 The court found that there was no evidence showing that the employer
placed the thought in the employees’ mind.339 Nor was there evidence that the
employer stood silent while knowing that the employees believed they were to
receive vested benefits.340 Because of this, there could be no breach of a
fiduciary duty under ERISA.341
Under Skinner, it seems that in order to bring a breach of fiduciary duty,
the retirees, prior to retirement, have to ask the employer whether or not the
benefits vested and the employer has to give an affirmative response.342
Employees who believe they are going to receive vested benefits would have
no reason to ask such a question. Employers, even if they believe benefits are
supposed to vest, can avoid liability under a fiduciary duty analysis by keeping
quiet.343 The analysis will only prevent incidents of the employer making
explicit statements that the benefits are to vest, but those situations are rare as
demonstrated by the multitude of litigation making its way to the U.S. Circuit
Courts of Appeals.344
Because other judicial alternatives do not provide an acceptable
alternative, the next question that arises is whether the Yard-Man inference is
acceptable, or whether a legislative alternative is needed. One must answer
both questions affirmatively. The Yard-Man inference is acceptable. At the
same time, legislation could clarify the positions the employer and union
should take in negotiation regarding such benefits. Legislation could also
better protect health and life insurance benefits that retirees believe are to last a
lifetime. Perhaps it would allow all parties involved to avoid the harsh
consequence of being forced into court each time an employer, for whatever
reason, decides to cut benefits.
V. THE YARD-MAN INFERENCE SERVING AS A SUBSTITUTE UNTIL
LEGISLATION IS AVAILABLE TO PROTECT RETIREES
The thrust of this Comment has been to establish the validity of the YardMan inference through a critique of its criticisms and the shortcomings of
judicial alternatives.345 In fact, the Yard-Man inference can stand on its own as
a valid principle. Currently, it is the only choice retirees have to challenge an
improper termination of benefits. However, because the employers and union
338. See id. at 150-51.
339. See id. at 150.
340. Id.
341. See id. at 150.
342. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 150-51. The retirees would also have had a claim if the
employer went about making explicit statements that the benefits were to vest upon retirement.
See id.
343. See id.
344. See supra notes 61-215 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 216-344 and accompanying text.
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should be able to enter negotiations knowing the status of welfare benefits, this
should not be an invitation to abandon calls for legislation to remedy the
situations discussed.
A.

The Yard-Man as a Valid Principle of Interpretation

Critics of the inference focus on the dangers of a “presumption” that
benefits vest.346 It has been demonstrated that the Yard-Man decision did not
establish such a presumption.347 Instead, the burdens of persuasion and
production of evidence remain with the retirees in establishing that the benefits
vested upon retirement. The Yard-Man inference is only a factor contributing
to a general inference that benefits in a specific situation were to vest upon
retirement.348 Employers should not fear Yard-Man. Because it is only an
inference, rather than a presumption, finders of fact would be free to reject the
inference of vested benefits. Thus, the inference only works to preserve a
promise made to retirees before they retired. It acts only as an additional tool
in discerning the intent of the parties.
Perhaps the courts could run wild with the inference and establish a
presumption that benefits are to vest in every situation. However, it has been
shown that this has not happened in the Sixth Circuit, even though the court
has adopted broader language when discussing the law.349 The application of
the law has remained the same.350
One drawback to the inference is that anytime there is an alleged wrongful
termination of benefits, retirees must fight the employer in the courts. The
union no longer has a duty to represent the retirees.351 Even though the union
may find it in its interest to help its former members along, retirees may have
to fight alone. For retirees and employers alike, this presents huge legal fees.
This is a harsh reality of solving the problem through the courts. Despite the
validity of the inference, legislation is needed. Any legislation should allow
the employer and employee to know ahead of time whether or not benefits are
going to vest in the employee upon retirement. Current legislation is simply
inadequate.352

346. See supra notes 217-81 and accompanying text.
347. See id.
348. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 109-26 and accompanying text.
350. See id.
351. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157,
168 (1971).
352. See infra notes 353-64 and accompanying text.
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The Inadequacy of Current Legislation and the Search for Other
Alternatives

From the analysis thus far, it is clear that ERISA does not solve the
problem of Yard-Man. ERISA does not require the vesting of welfare benefits,
and its fiduciary duty requirements do not provide retirees with a remedy.353
Commentators on ERISA have admitted as such.354 Knowing that retirees
were facing serious problems trying to afford health care, Congress went back
to the drawing board.
The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”) was
passed to provide protection against the unilateral termination of health
insurance benefits.355 The law requires that retirees be allowed to continue
participating in the group health insurance plan provided to active employees
for eighteen months after separating from employment.356 Thus, retirees were
given at least eighteen months to find new coverage. This was positive
legislation in light of the confusion among the circuits regarding whether and
when welfare benefits should vest.357
COBRA only gives protection for eighteen months.358 Retirees will then
have to find new coverage. The expense of health insurance, even coverage
supplemental to Medicare, looms for a retiree losing benefits at the end of the
eighteen months.359
Next, COBRA does not require employers to continue paying for retirees’
coverage. Rather, it only requires that retirees be allowed to participate in the
coverage provided to active employees at the group rate.360 Thus, while this
coverage will be cheaper than other insurance, the retiree is still required to
pay the premiums. In addition, the employer may charge a 2% surcharge.361

353. See infra notes 354-65 and accompanying text.
354. See Ossi, supra note 55, at 249; Brouwer, supra note 320, at 992. In addition, at least
one commentator argued that “E.R.I.S.A. provides little control over employers’ self interested
behavior and arguably has been interpreted by courts as a protective cover for employer decisions
that are decidedly harmful to their employee-principals where health insurance benefits are
concerned.” Dayna Bowen Matthew, Article: Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of
Employment-Based Health Insurance:Of Markets, Courts, and a Regulatory Quagmire 31 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1037, 1067 (1996).
355. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272. See also
Weckstein, supra note 38, at 134-35.
356. See id. at 134-45.
357. See id.
358. See id.
359. See id.
360. See id.
361. See David L. Gregory, COBRA: Congress Provides Partial Protection Against Employer
Termination of Retiree Health Insurance, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 77, 84 (1987).
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Thus, the retiree still has to pay 102% of the cost of health insurance after
retirement.362
In recent years, legislation has been introduced that would prevent
employers from terminating benefits when retirees challenged the company’s
obligations in court.363 In addition, the legislation also placed the burden of
persuasion on the employer to prove that the termination was allowed by
ERISA documents or collective bargaining agreement.364 This type of
legislation has failed to muster enough votes on two separate occasions.365
The failure of this legislation is a disappointment for retirees. Like
COBRA, it would be a step in the right direction. This would encourage
employers to be clear about the benefits from the beginning. Thus, the union
could better negotiate for the vested benefits at the bargaining table. It would
not necessarily chill offers of welfare benefits because it is not an absolute
vesting requirement.366 Neither would it require an employer to bargain over
retirement benefits in the first place. It only requires continuing benefits if the
retirees challenge the employer’s obligations until a court can resolve the issue.
In addition, negotiators for both unions and employers could establish
positions knowing who would have the burden of proof if a dispute was to
arise. While the law would still require going to court, the retirees would be
better protected because they would maintain the benefits until the case was
decided.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is easy to argue that the problem of Yard-Man is not a problem because
Medicare acts as a retirees’ safety net. That is, if a retiree loses health
insurance from a former employer, Medicare is there to soften the blow.
However, Medicare is inadequate.367 Retirees must find supplemental
coverage for anything that Medicare does not cover.
The Yard-Man inference is necessary to prevent employers from breaking
a promise of lifetime benefits. When the employer allows its employees to
believe they are receiving vested health insurance benefits, the employer
should be held accountable when it attempts to terminate those benefits after
the collective bargaining agreement expires. The Yard-Man inference adds to
362. See id. See also Weckstein, supra note 38, at 135.
363. Retiree Health Benefits Protection Act, S. 1268, 104th Cong. (1993). See also Ossi,
supra note 55, at 256.
364. See id. at 256.
365. See id.
366. Presumably, if an employer knows that benefits have to vest, the issue would never reach
the bargaining table. As a permissive subject of bargaining under the NLRA, the employer has
no duty to bargain for the retiree benefits. Rather, whether such benefits enter negotiations is a
function of the bargaining power and desires of the union. Id.
367. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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the factors that can be shown by a retiree trying to demonstrate what the parties
actually meant when the collective bargaining agreement was negotiated.
Employers should not fear a situation in which they end up paying for benefits
when such benefits were never promised. The existence of the benefits alone
is not enough to establish vested benefits. Retirees still bear the burden of
proof and production of the original intent of the employer and union. The
finder of fact can then determine whether to accept or reject the inference
based on the credibility of the parties.
ERISA and COBRA are positive laws that provide some assistance, but
they do not solve the problems faced by retirees and employers in a Yard-Man
situation.368 Courts should continue using the Sixth Circuit inference. It is
possible that the inference will not be enough to demonstrate vested benefits,
and the retirees will suffer the loss of benefits. Regardless, it is imperative that
the circuits stop mowing over Yard-Man until alternative legislation is
possible.
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